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In a study drawing from both evolutionary biology and the social sciences, 
evidence and argument is assembled in support of the comprehensive appli-
cation of selfish gene theory to the human population. With a focus on genes 
giving rise to characteristically-human cooperation (“cooperative genes”) in-
volving language and theory of mind, one may situate a whole range of pat-
terned behaviour—including celibacy and even slavery—otherwise seeming to 
present insuperable difficulties. Crucially, the behaviour which tends to propa-
gate the cooperative genes may be “at cost” to the genes of some who may be 
party to the cooperation itself. Explanatory insights are provided by Trivers’ 
parent-offspring conflict theory, Lack’s principle, and Hamilton’s kin selec-
tion mechanism. A primary observation is that cooperation using language 
and theory of mind is itself interdependent with full human conceptualization 
of a world of objects and of themselves as embodied beings. Human capaci-
ties inhering in, or arising out of, the ability to cooperate are also responsible 
for a vitally important long-term process, the domestication of animals and p- 
lants. The approach illuminates the difference between animal and human 
sexual behaviour, and the emergence of kinship systems. Again, recent pat-
terns of population growth become much more explicable. It is argued that 
the gene is the single controlling replicator; the notion of the meme as a sec-
ond independent replicator is flawed. 
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the twentieth century, the Darwinian theory of evolution and the new under-
standing of genetics were synthesized. Then building upon various other theo-
retical contributions (e.g. Williams, 1966a) the notion of the selfish gene was in-
troduced (Dawkins, 1976, 2006) and has since become highly influential (Grafen 
& Ridley, 2006). That theoretical development has proved to have considerable 
explanatory power by expressing a gene-centred view of evolution as opposed to 
the original organism-focused Darwinian approach. The notion assists understand-
ing of such behaviour as one organism behaving in a seemingly selfless way in 
relation to another closely genetically-related one, the most familiar example be-
ing mammalian maternal behaviour in relation to her off-spring. The core idea is 
that genes which tend to get passed on are ones which have consequences which 
in turn “serve the interests of the genes” in the sense of increasing the likelihood 
of their survival and further propagation. Thus the behaviour of a mother may 
sometimes be at risk to herself while nevertheless tending to increase the like-
lihood of those of her genes shared with her off-spring (one half) surviving. 
It is essential to be clear what is meant by “selfish” in this context. Emphati-
cally, it does not mean that individuals with the genes would tend to act in sel-
fish ways. Rather the idea is that the genes, in a certain sense, act only for them-
selves; their only “interest” is in their own replication—to be passed on to the 
next generation. Should it be the case that, because of their action, some other 
genes, e.g. those carried by other organisms, lose out by failing to replicate, that 
is simply an unfortunate-for-them consequence. Of course, it is the case that 
genes do not “want” or “intend” anything, but it has turned out to be convenient 
and suggestive shorthand to focus on their selfishness in this specific sense. At 
root, what is being got at is the notion that genes that act in a particular way, e.g. 
give rise to particular types of behaviour, are more likely to get passed on, even 
though this may be “at cost” to other genes. They have, as it were, power as rep-
licators. 
This is an attempt to test the theory of the selfish gene in relation to the hu-
man population. It takes something of the form of a feasibility study, whereby 
the aim is to judge whether patterns in human life may be interpreted within 
that theoretical context. In this connection, it is important to acknowledge that 
many evolutionary biologists working on human behaviour adhere to the indi-
cated general perspective, but there is a discernible tendency among them to 
equivocate on the central issue, partly to avoid having to confront counter-argu- 
ments from social scientists. There are felt to be problems with such phenomena 
as priestly celibacy or use of contraceptives which are hardly behaviours which 
promulgate the genes of those involved. 
There is also the familiar orienting notion that in humans’ cultural evolution 
in some sense “takes over” from biological evolution. Quite reasonably too, it 
may initially be felt to be unpromising theoretically to attempt to subsume under 
a single explanatory concept, on the one hand, patterns of animal behaviour 
which are sometimes properly to be characterized as stereotyped, and on the oth-
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tional and flexible. Certainly, any move in this direction would need to ac-
knowledge cultural variations but without “culture” forming a primary explana-
tory concept.  
In fact, this line of thought involves conceptual confusion. It is one thing to 
say that there is a single evolutionary framework, but there is a big difference 
between saying that genes determine behaviour directly and saying that they de-
termine behaviour indirectly through complex decision-making processes. The 
former works at the level of simple organisms, the latter is how it works in com-
plex organisms such as mammals, and especially primates (Santos & Rosati, 
2015). What might be true of insects is not true for higher vertebrates who make 
complex decisions on a moment-by-moment basis. Basically, the point of having 
a big brain is to be able to adjust behaviour strategically and tactically in re-
sponse to local circumstances. What is determined genetically here is not the 
behaviour but the capacity to make a decision that optimises output by solving 
local problems (a process known as “satisficing”) and thus contributing indi-
rectly to genetic fitness (Reuter & Montag, 2016).  
It is envisaged that in the passage from the purely hominid to Homo sapiens, 
genetic change took place so that humans could (and subsequently did) coope-
rate using language and theory of mind (in contrast to the cooperation mani-
fested by purely animal species). In this connection, oral language use may in it-
self take the form of a type of cooperation or it may also stimulate or be interde-
pendent with other types of cooperation (Dunbar, 1996). In respect of the ways 
language may be deployed, five possible types of speech acts may be distin-
guished (Searle, 2010: p. 69). What is being got at by reference to “theory of 
mind” is the human ability to attribute mental states to others, to theorise how 
other humans’ thought processes work e.g. to grasp their intentions and reasons 
for action (Carruthers & Smith, 1996); that ability is itself enhanced by language 
use. 
Since prior to this genetic change there would already have been patterned in-
teraction between close blood relatives, it is important to make clear that, fol-
lowing the change, cooperation of the type indicated is possible between both 
those with and those without blood ties. While there have been attempts to un-
derstand cooperative behaviour in evolutionary terms, for instance by consider-
ing strategies giving rise to it (e.g. Axelrod, 1984), those approaching human 
behaviour utilizing the notion of the selfish gene have not focused their account 
—as is being done here—on the notion of genetic change giving rise to characte-
ristically-human cooperative behaviour. It is fully recognized that genetic change 
which is here encapsulated in a phrase will have occurred in stages over a long 
period of time. There may be expected to be differences in relevant respects from 
and among such beings as Australopithecus, Homo habilis, and Homo ergaster 
(see Dawkins, 2010: pp. 196-197) which are germane to their length of survival 
and eventual extinction.  
So an attempt is here made to test the effective explanatory power of the ap-
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human genes giving rise to cooperation, or “cooperative genes” as they may be 
called. The next important step is to identify the deep conceptual basis of human 
cooperation. It may be judged that this is interdependent both with the human 
use of language and their utilisation of theory of mind. 
2. The Conceptual Basis of Human Cooperation 
Plainly language develops only gradually—it changes continuously—and to un-
derstand its role it is necessary to take account of origins and antecedents. Hu-
mans evolved from other primates and one can speculate about aspects of the 
origins of language, but do so responsibly (Startup, 2019: pp. 456-457). Although 
we now know about an immense universe, the origins of language would lie in 
the perspectives of groups of preliterate peoples with close blood ties. Very 
roughly there must have been a passage from an animal world of sensation 
(where sensations are “private”) through to a human grasp through language 
that existence is within “a world of objects” (where objects are “public”). Impor-
tantly, the latter understanding is not culturally variable but is common to all 
human groups (however much their vocabularies may vary), making it clear that 
it has a genetic source.  
The world of objects—the physical world—roughly speaking consists of the 
two overlapping classes of things we can use—potential resources—but also ob-
stacles or things we “come up against”. Human bodies are numbered among the 
physical objects. Indeed they are to be construed as an essential feature, a foun-
dational element of the physical world. This is to do with the fact that they nec-
essarily have the same object status as things with which they are in contact or 
“touch”. From the outset bodily differentiation is the primary way we are indi-
viduated as people.  
It may be judged that the passage through to this type of understanding is in-
deed interdependent with both the nature of language and the use of theory of 
mind. On the first point one must note that language is public and primarily 
concerned with what is understood to be a public world: it could not work 
simply in relation to private sensations to which people in general have no 
access. Language is interdependent with the understanding that we exist within a 
world of objects because: 1) objects provide language with its primary con-
tent—they ensure language is “about” something; but 2) language enables people 
to “compare notes” on what may be experienced, for example seen or touched, 
given successive occupancy of what is understood through language to be the 
same place or differing places, hence they are able to identify a particular object; 
again, language enables what differing people may see or touch at differing times 
to be integrated into a broader understanding of “the situation” embracing sev-
eral objects. For instance, it is through language that it becomes “common 
knowledge” or an established fact that a hill or river may be seen from a particu-
lar home base but is some distance from it. The persistence of objects is concep-
tually integrated with an emergent conception of the past and future. 
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theory of mind. To take a simple example: suppose a child is seen by a first ob-
server to hide a thimble behind a screen so that it may not be seen directly by 
that observer. Then a second observer enters the room but takes up a different 
position within it. It could then be the case that the first observer immediately 
judges that the second observer from his or her position can directly see the 
thimble even though he himself or she herself cannot. This example illustrates 
the more general point that all the time in life we are shaping our behaviour in 
the light of our understanding of the perspective and purposes of others. Impor-
tantly, however, one has to have a conception of a physical object in a particular 
position to judge that another may see it (as with the thimble); again, one must 
understand another person to be in a particular position to judge what may be 
seen from that position. On the other hand, the implication goes rather in the 
opposite direction when one says that continual successful utilisation of theory 
of mind, as in this example, tends to be confirmatory of the understanding that 
we exist within a world of physical objects. Indeed the use of that theory helps to 
secure that understanding through extended time. 
Given a focus on cooperation, the last four paragraphs could hardly be more 
important since the public world of objects (which includes humans themselves) 
is the stage upon/within which the elaborating drama of human cooperation is 
played out. Once objects are identified which are understood to persist in time 
humans can begin to develop and expand upon all the types of understanding 
with which we present-day humans are familiar (including those of a rudimen-
tary technological or scientific type) which bear upon their interests and con-
cerns e.g. they are enabled to gain more predictable access to their sources of 
food and water. 
3. The Material Basis for Human Cooperation; Group  
Augmentation Theory 
Importantly, population and population growth are material in their nature. 
From this point the world of objects—the material world—is potentially fully 
available to serve the interests of the cooperative genes, while human know-
ledge—initially very limited and distributed—is free to grow in an open-ended, 
unlimited, and increasingly integrated way. It is the combination of the two that 
holds out such promise for the cooperative genes. 
In respect of the application of the theory of the selfish gene to humans, as al-
ready implied, the suggestion may arise that humans may be expected to be sel-
fish; at least this may be a kind of default expectation. Let it be said without qua-
lification: this is mistaken. It is mistaken for a particularly straightforward rea-
son: humans need to cooperate to gain access to the means of their own subsis-
tence. Hence applicable here is the group augmentation hypothesis (or mutual-
ism) which is to the effect that if helpers in such cooperative groups raise the re-
productive success of the group, then the benefits of living in a resulting larger 
group—improved survival or future reproductive success—favour the evolution 
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to cooperative hunting and cooperative defence. It involves the group being able 
to do things more effectively than the individual can, but this serves the interests 
of the genes of individuals (Kokko, Johnstone, & Clutton-Brock, 2001; Kingma 
et al., 2014). The implication is that some larger groups may be expected to 
emerge sustained by more effective cooperative behaviour.  
It seems this was indeed the prominent behavioural pattern marking the 
emergence of modern humans in Africa. With respect to members of such hu-
man groups it is relevant to say that it is in their interests to cooperate for sus-
tained periods, even if they also spend a lot of time bickering and quarrelling, as 
we know they do. Indeed conflict internal to a group (perhaps generational in its 
nature) may give rise to division or segmentation. Hence an important basic 
piece of evidence that the theory may apply concerns the fact that at the stage 
when it consisted of hunters and gatherers, the human population increased in 
numbers as it spread relatively thinly throughout the habitable continents. As 
part of this, the first colonization of the Americas from Alaska to Patagonia in 
perhaps as little as 2000 years is a particularly striking phenomenon (Diamond, 
1998: pp. 37-47). The dispersal of the human population involved adapting to 
highly varied environments, made possible by cooperative behaviour in respect 
of such activities as hunting, provision of clothing and use of fire. As Darwin af-
firms species succeed that diversify their range.  
Even today, when one feels the human population “eggs” are all carried within 
a much more integrated “island Earth”, at least one can say that the pattern of 
dispersal on the planet offers some support to overall numbers from the destruc-
tion of individual habitats. The need for cooperation among humans is evident 
from the simplest societies to the most complex. Once humans use language to 
define the values and interests enabling them to live and flourish, realising and 
expressing those values and interests will require a high level of cooperation. Of 
course, at times there will be free riders but we cannot all be free riders all the 
time; it would also be in our interests to act against free riders e.g. by punishing 
or shaming them (Bowles & Gintis, 2013: pp. 186-191). 
4. The Normative Element in Cooperation; the Division of  
Labour 
The last observation dramatises the point that a normative (or “deontological”) 
element tends to come to inhere in sustained cooperation of any type. When an 
instance of cooperation is in train, whether or not individual parties will follow 
through is typically in doubt or at issue; we “rely” on others. Now the pattern of 
cooperation would not have evolved if there were not an overall tendency for 
cooperation to be successful; it is cooperation carried through which delivers the 
benefits. The key development in humans making this possible involves the 
process of “internalisation”: basically the person has come to feel they ought, at 
least to some degree, to be “reliable”. 
In a modern society a whole vocabulary concerned with issues of trust focuses 
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tion the need for cooperation is the crucible for the emergence of morality, 
which is of course bound up with how the scope of normative expectations be-
comes extended to wider populations. As it does so, morality constitutes a source 
of stabilizing regulation: the achievement of goals on a cooperative basis be-
comes more predictable. At the risk of over-dramatising, the greatest single 
achievement is the prevention of a Hobbesian “war of all against all”. From the 
outset this tends to be avoided by emergent morality together with the pattern-
ing of interests and values; plainly too, the long-term build up of institutions of 
social control makes a decisive contribution. The patterning and regulation of 
behaviour provides context for population growth.  
The existence of a normative element within cooperation has further signifi-
cant implications. It means that humans can have reasons for action which are 
“desire-independent”; they can choose to “delay gratification”. By contrast, pre- 
human behaviour would be “desire-dependent”. What is being got at here is that 
humans can work towards something which is not intrinsically desired, but is 
understood to be a step towards or means towards something else which is de-
sired. Closely related is the phenomenon of inhibition, the pattern whereby an 
individual wants or desires something but refrains from its direct and immediate 
pursuance because of internalized constraint. Cooperation thus involves virtual-
ly from the outset means-ends orientation and a delayed gratification pattern. 
Humans can foresee what is needed to achieve a desired objective, can plan, and 
attempt to work through the various required stages, some or many of which are 
not desired intrinsically. 
In this connection a particularly useful capacity which humans possess and 
which distinguishes them from other animals is their ability comprehensively to 
copy i.e. to copy in any respect or any aspect. This is of the greatest value in 
practice since it enables them to duplicate what are judged to be effective ways of 
doing things. Moreover this ability may steadily expand in scope given a context 
of human cooperation taken together with full conceptualization of the material 
world. For instance, copying (duplicating) a structure such as a tool or a shelter 
is feasible given full conceptualization of the world of objects, but it may rea-
sonably be doubted whether this would be possible in (say) a world of sensa-
tions. The phenomenon of copying seems to be associated with the ability to 
adopt a third-person perspective which itself arises out of cooperation. 
Building upon the ability to copy, characteristically-human cooperation di-
rectly opens the way to an almost indefinitely extended and highly flexible ela-
boration in the human division of labour, to be contrasted with the rudimentary 
and in a sense “stereotyped” one observable in higher animals. Utilising theory 
of mind one individual may not just understand the role of another person (e.g. 
in the way the pupil grasps the role of the teacher) but may begin to see how to 
perform that role themselves; they are, in sum, able to “take the role of the oth-
er” (Blumer, 1969). The fact that almost anyone can minimally act on the stage 
points in the same direction. Now, of course it is the case that many roles require 
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these more specialized aspects could themselves be imparted through a set of 
cooperative relationships in situations where there are already practitioners 
around (as with craftsman and apprentice). The elaboration of the division of 
labour evident in any society and its massive elaboration in one like ours arise 
out of the phenomenon of characteristically-human cooperation: no other es-
sentially different additional capacity in humans needs to be postulated. Yet the 
phenomenon of the elaboration and specialization of labour is at the root of both 
simple and complex human societies; indeed it may be identified as the key 
source of population growth. However, the significance of this particular obser-
vation becomes clearer once one reflects on the implications of the point that the 
cooperative genes may be considered as “selfish”. 
5. The Importance of Aggregates Rather Than Individuals 
It follows from the theory of the selfish gene that, in becoming established, new 
genes such as these give rise to behaviour which tends in the next and then sub-
sequent generations to promulgate the new genes themselves (the influence of 
genes may hence be thought of as “reflexive”) i.e. in this case the genetic change 
would tend to give rise to a large and increasing population of people with the 
new cooperative genes. As already indicated, it also follows from the theory that 
this tendency for new genes to give rise to behaviour tending to promulgate 
themselves may be “at cost” to the promulgation of other genes: as has been 
stressed, this is what is meant by calling the genes “selfish”.  
It is envisaged that the above applies here i.e. that the promulgation of the 
new genes can be expected to be “at cost” to the promulgation of other genes. In 
particular, since cooperation always involves more than one person an absolute 
expansion in the population of people able to cooperate may be accompanied by 
a relative or absolute failure to promulgate the genes of individuals or classes of 
people some of whom may be party to the cooperation themselves. Fundamen-
tally, in respect of the new “cooperative genes”, it is the overall growth in num-
bers of cooperating people which matters, while there may be identifiable “win-
ners” and “losers” as a consequence of that cooperation itself. There may, for in-
stance, be identifiable persons or categories with high or low fertility, or high or 
low mortality.  
Example (1): At various times in Eastern societies there has been the institu-
tion of the ruler’s harem with attendant eunuchs. Genetic studies estimate that 
0.5% of all males in the world alive today are the descendants of Genghis Khan 
and his siblings (and 7% within the boundary of the Mongol empire; Zergal et 
al., 2003). These types of arrangements have massive genetic and evolutionary 
consequences for some individual lineages at the expense of others.  
Example (2): In northwest Germany in the eighteenth century most of the 
population consisted of small-holders and landless labourers. Small-holders 
represented just 20% of the population in 1720, but 150 years later their descen-
dants represented 80% of the population because the mortality of landless la-
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Example (3): The Roman Catholic Church has been a central institution in 
many societies and incorporates cooperative behaviour between those at the 
same or differing levels within a hierarchy. That church has encouraged growth 
in the human population e.g. by proscribing the use of manufactured contracep-
tives and suicide. The tendency to promote growth in numbers is nevertheless 
“at cost” to the genes of the celibate priesthood. 
Example (4): Ancient societies such as Greece and Rome were based on sla-
very yet their populations rose for extended periods. Within a slave-owning so-
ciety the age-specific mortality rates and the overall mortality rate of the slaves 
may be expected to be higher than those of the slave-owners, yet there can be a 
tendency nevertheless for population numbers to rise. The overall growth in 
numbers is “at cost” to the genes of some of the slaves.  
The institution of slavery is, perhaps surprisingly, instructive for present pur-
poses. In an unexpected way that institution, ubiquitous in antiquity, points up 
the significance of a very important type of cooperation for present purpos-
es—that which is coerced. Slaves tended to originate from those defeated in bat-
tle. They could have been killed but there is gain in product from putting them 
to work. The males could be castrated or maimed, but, again, there can be a net 
gain from instead allowing them to breed, thereby providing a continuous 
supply of slaves. In connection with slavery coerced cooperation is advanced 
while the mortality which could have followed defeat is reduced. Notably too, 
slavery is found in otherwise widely differing cultures and contexts. There is the 
added point that female slaves were often taken over as concubines in all these 
societies. For instance the Icelandic Viking family sagas frequently refer to fe-
male “Irish” (meaning Celtic) slaves, and indeed 80% of living Icelandic women 
have Celtic mtDNA (inherited only down the female line) (Helgason et al., 2000). 
To put the position generally, one can say that cooperation (which will be oc-
curring simultaneously at differing levels within a complex society) tends to give 
rise to a growing population but also to differentials in the vital rates of fertility, 
mortality and migration between sub-populations which are governed by the 
nature of the cooperation itself. In this connection one must be sensitive to the 
existence of differing kinds of aggregates. Familiar from ecology is the important 
distinction between aggregations (herds) and congregations (stable social groups) 
(These are very different and make very different cognitive demands on their 
members. Primates have the latter, which is why they have such big brains). 
Among humans one finds both social groups and social categories producing 
differentials. Regarding the latter, it is evident that within advanced societies and 
arising out of the division and specialisation of labour, there are differentials in 
fertility and mortality within and between social class categories, one source be-
ing the differentially hazardous nature of individual occupations. 
The demographic patterns at the present time across vast swathes of the 
Earth’s surface point firmly to the emphasis here on the importance of aggre-
gates as against individuals. At the present time the world population is growing 
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portion of that population who are paying a substantial cost in terms of the loss 
of their own potential fertility is also growing; this is strikingly the case in Eu-
rope and Japan, where some national populations are even in decline. The Eu-
ropean pattern of small family size is becoming much more widespread. Indi-
viduals are evidently not generally acting in ways which maximize the likelihood 
of the promulgation of their own genes. Hence an attempt to account for beha-
viour by reference to the selfish gene on an individualized basis would plainly 
fail. However, once the move is made to foreground cooperative genes observa-
ble patterns become explicable. Paradoxically, the overall world population is 
growing while many, perhaps most, individuals are “paying a substantial cost” in 
terms of the loss of their own potential fertility.  
6. A Best-of-a-Bad-Job Strategy 
In ordinary parlance the word “cooperation” tends most often to be used when 
the parties are acting (wholly) willingly; but, as implied above, its usage must not 
be so confined here. The patterns in human life would not remotely be as they 
are in the absence of coerced cooperation and, importantly, there are degrees of 
coercion. Slavery is to be understood as a type of cooperation, albeit subject to 
massive constraint; the slave may perhaps in his or her work be described as 
cooperating “minimally”. Further comment is appropriate, however, since many 
evolutionary biologists might be disinclined to see it as cooperation as such; 
there is a need to situate it in evolutionary terms. Focusing on the slave, roughly 
speaking it is a classic best-of-a-bad-job strategy from an evolutionary point of 
view; where those less favoured use alternative reproductive tactics to minimize 
their disadvantage (Dawkins, 1980). In this case slavery is better than death, be-
cause at least a slave has some chance of surviving to reproduce and the next 
generation may do much better. This was, in fact, the issue faced by war-chiefs 
among the nineteenth century Cheyenne. The peace-chief role was hereditary 
and they never fought with war-bands; but war-chiefs did and they took an oath 
never to leave the field of battle alive unless victorious (Dunbar, 1991; Keeley, 
1996). The payoff was that if they survived, they could demit from their oath and 
return to conventional society, where they were a great attraction to the opposite 
sex, so they did very well indeed reproductively (even compared to peace-chiefs). 
Their initial problem it transpires was that they were originally all orphans, 
slaves and others from the dregs of society who had no hope of marriage because 
of their status. Hence it was a high risk/high gain strategy, and many did not 
succeed. They had very limited options, as is usual for the losers in tribal war. 
Hence one is able to situate slavery from an evolutionary point of view. 
7. Domestication 
A further long-term process of the utmost importance for population growth is 
the domestication of animals and plants (Petersen, 1969: p. 348). Given the 
theory being evaluated, it is highly significant that it is human capacities inher-
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Essentially, humans relate to animals using theory of mind and the capacity to 
“take the role of the other” even though the animals themselves do not (fully) 
reciprocate. To take a striking example, a shepherd signals to his or her dog giv-
en the shepherd’s understanding of the view the dog has of a flock of sheep i.e. in 
an imaginative sense the shepherd “takes the role” of the dog. In general, human 
action leading to animal or plant domestication is informed by implicit or expli-
cit understanding of an animal’s or plant’s life process e.g. 1) from a position 
near a campfire a man throws a piece of meat to a wolf; 2) a woman wishes a 
plant to grow so she removes weeds and waters it. There is a sense in which the 
human agent is “looking at life” from the wolf’’s or plant’s point of view; he/she 
is serving the “interests” of the genes of that particular animal or plant. 
There again, through time multifarious qualities of differing types are selected 
for in the human population—the gene pool changes in patterned ways for ex-
tended periods; one may even be tempted to speak of human “domestication” 
(Pagel, 2012: Chapter 3)—but a key point is that judgments as to the “fitness” of 
particular categories can only be made relative to an environment increasingly 
shaped by cooperation. Thus impractical people may now be accommodated in 
“ivory towers”! The qualities selected for in animals and plants tend to serve 
cooperatively-defined human interests, while those selected for in the human 
population tend to make the overall pattern of cooperation easier to sustain or 
expand. 
8. Key Elements of the Social Fabric 
Given our animal nature, plainly sexual bonds and relations between blood rela-
tives represent a vital basis but both are changed with the coming of characteris-
tically-human cooperation. Regarding sex the key point is that there arises a 
range of options, which means that the potential for sex to be an ingredient of 
differing types of cooperative relationship (no doubt characterized by differing 
patterns in power relations) and, in particular, its ability to be economically sig-
nificant, increases. Importantly, the sexual tie may underpin the couple (or fam-
ily) as a unit of economic production or consumption. 
Absolutely vital is the way in which cooperation, on the basis of on-going ties 
between blood relatives, gives rise to the different but related phenomenon of 
kinship i.e. the social recognition of blood ties; but it is abundantly apparent 
that, at the same time, this is the source of a variety of kinship systems i.e. it ge-
nerates cultural variation (Fox, 1984: p. 39; Startup, 2014: pp. 83-84). There is 
the broad contrast in pre-literate societies between matrilineal and patrilineal 
systems, the latter reckoned by Fox (1984: p. 114) to be the “neater” institutional 
solution to potential conflict problems. In this context marriage comes to define 
the position of off-spring, bearing, for instance, on issues of inheritance and 
succession. A framework of affinal and kinship links both renews and integrates 
society (Beattie, 1993). This is the primary system of co-action and coordination 
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9. The Importance of Trivers’ Parent-Offspring Conflict  
Theory and Lack’s Principle 
The pattern of that growth, however, may only be understood with the help of 
additional biological principles. Consider, for instance, the aforementioned case 
of the celibacy of the Roman Catholic priesthood. The celibacy pattern may at 
first sight look like genetic “altruism”, but on closer inspection it lends itself to a 
different interpretation. Roughly speaking, it almost invariably turns out to owe 
something to “parental manipulation” of offspring, a pattern pointed up in Tri-
vers’ parent-offspring conflict theory (Trivers, 1974; Haig, 1993). In this connec-
tion, there are many clear well-studied examples, from the Tibetans to the late 
medieval Portuguese nobility to the aforementioned peasant farmers of 18th and 
19th century north-west Germany. The problem is always shortage of land and 
how to manage (genetic) lineage survival into future generations under ecologi-
cal constraint, where constant division of family land generation after generation 
would quickly result in impoverishment and extinction. 
In the German case (Voland & Beise, 2002) to prevent economic disaster (i.e. 
being reduced to landless labourers), the smallholders operated what the histo-
rians call an heir-and-spare strategy on their sons (but not daughters!)—one to 
inherit the family farm and a backup in case he died. The mortality rate on sub-
sequent sons was 50% in the first 12 months of life, which parents were aware of 
and which shaped their behaviour (e.g. as reflected in their allocation of god-pa- 
rents). Turning to consider Irish evidence, analysis of seminary entries in An-
trim during the late nineteenth century shows that seminarians came mainly 
from large families with a lot of boys, and were invariably the younger ones. 
The underlying reason for this pattern is that humans, in particular, maximise 
fitness by maximising lineage survival, which is all about optimising parental in-
vestment in offspring, not by maximising parental investment in each offspring. 
This is a general principle in evolutionary biology known as Lack’s Principle that 
was worked out in the 1950s in studies of robins and other small UK birds. Lack 
found that birds adjust the clutch size to correspond to the largest number of 
young for which the parents can, on average, provide enough food, with a spare 
to allow for some natural losses along the way (Lack, 1954; Williams, 1966b). 
10. The Social Contract 
The last sections concern family and lineage phenomena, but a key concern is 
with the emergence of larger human groups. In this connection, a suggestive 
orienting idea (as it has proved to be in other social and philosophical contexts) 
is that of the “social contract”. Fundamentally, primate societies are in effect im-
plicit social contracts: they live in stable social groups (primarily to avoid preda-
tion, in fact, not to hunt together) and this requires them to be able to inhibit 
what psychologists call “prepotent” actions (those using excessive exercise of 
power or influence) because failure to do so destabilises groups and causes their 
dispersal—so losing the benefit of being in the group (Dunbar, 2011). Particu-
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tolerate each other and to reduce the huge costs of living in close proximity. One 
such mechanism is wider social recognition of kinship ties noted above; another 
is the division and specialization of labour. Often a two-step process may be dis-
cerned: there is a need to solve the problem of how to manage large groups ef-
fectively in order to be able to solve an ecological problem (predation risk) 
(Dunbar & Shultz, 2017). Where the first problem is solved, the second may be 
solved consequentially. Further cooperation emerges later as a derived benefit 
once these groups are established, and is usually predominantly between ex-
tended family members (reflecting Hamilton’s kin selection mechanism that is 
derivative of the concept of inclusive fitness; Hamilton, 1964; 1975; Barrett et al., 
2002), but may then be further elaborated. 
11. Society and Population 
As groups become larger, two patterns may be distinguished. The first involves 
the development of a segmentary society, in which a larger community might be 
made up of a number of lineages. Lineages would have leaders whose authority 
and status derive from their birth or seniority, with the group of lineage leaders 
acting as some kind of council of elders. The second pattern specifies that the 
larger the group, the more explicit is the exercise of authority and power, and the 
less egalitarian and more hierarchical the social organization. This second pat-
tern arises particularly from how groups tend to interact, as they inevitably will, 
as they grow larger. 
Diamond assists in the understanding of types of society, their interactions 
and the implications for population size and density. The tendency for popula-
tion numbers to increase is interdependent with changes in patterns of social 
control and of economic transfers (Diamond, 1998: pp. 286-288). When certain 
conditions are met, competition between societies may give rise to societies of 
greater complexity (Diamond, 1998: p. 289). As numbers grow, systematic change 
in respect of the division and specialization of labour is crucial in two respects: it 
tends to increase average product per person while diminishing the tendency for 
conflict to arise, conflict which might lead to maiming and increased mortality. 
Paradoxically, in settled societies the designation of space from which people are 
substantially excluded may indirectly give rise to population growth, through its 
impact on the dispersal of population.  
12. Religion and Population 
Religious beliefs and organizations are highly variable in their precise nature but 
virtually ubiquitous (Smart, 1993: pp. 12-23; Mithen, 1999; Atran, 2002; Bloom, 
2007; Wright, 2009), which invites explanation (Stark, 1990; Boyer, 2002; Boyd & 
Richerson, 2005; Wade, 2009). In this connection, strategic—and arising out of 
theory of mind—is the tendency towards bifurcation in respect of types of hu-
man explanation or understanding: there can be explanation by reference to 
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(or non-personal) causation (Startup, 2020). Religion tends to arise in the early 
circumstances of mankind because the idea of agency and explanation in terms 
of reasons and purposes is being applied in contexts where we would expect 
non-purposive explanation to be appropriate. As Harari (2014: p. 54) affirms, 
“most scholars agree that animistic beliefs were common among ancient forag-
ers”. This, in its turn, bears upon the structuring of rational action; it could be 
rational, for instance, to dam a stream to store fresh-water, but also rational to 
ask or pray for rain. Religion therefore arose partly because there was familiarity 
with purposive agency but lack of clarity about its precise scope and limits. 
There is space here to make the additional comment that religion in its generali-
ty is an adjustment to the situation where personal death in a material sense is 
understood to be inevitable and is feared (Startup, 2020: pp. 354-355). 
In its fully developed form religion possesses various aspects or dimensions: 
the practical and ritual, the experiential and emotional, the narrative or mythic, 
the ethical and legal, and the material (Smart, 1993). Religious groups are the 
largest which humans have created; they secure the social contract, particularly 
by promoting normative integration and social solidarity. A central concern here 
is the relation between religion and population. It has been argued that religion 
evolved as one of the behavioural mechanisms designed to facilitate community 
bonding (as numbers came to exceed 150) (Dunbar, 2020). The major religions 
existing at any particular date are to be understood as the survivors from a much 
larger pool; the group augmentation hypothesis (see above) helps situate the 
evolution of seemingly altruistic helping behaviour within them. There is good 
reason to judge that these “survivor” religions have traditionally encouraged a 
high level of fertility, partly because it is in their interests to do so. A high level 
here means one which is sufficient to promote gradual longer-term population 
growth despite such persistent and familiar patterns as high infant and high ma-
ternal mortality. In recent centuries, following rapid declines in age-specific 
mortality rates, the major religions have demonstrated varying degrees of flex-
ibility by modifying their outlook on fertility to some extent, acknowledging the 
contribution of at least some types of birth control and family planning methods 
(Heaton, 2011). Nevertheless religion’s overall contribution is generally to pro-
mote population growth. A specific way in which it does this is by discouraging 
or condemning suicide.  
13. Patterns in Prehistory and History 
In antiquity the population of hunter-gatherers tended to grow through expan-
sion in space. Significantly, the crucially important phenomenon of agriculture 
arose independently in at least seven regions of the world (Scarre, 2005). The 
emergence of agriculture may only be understood once it is appreciated that 
various incremental stages are involved as are differing associated phenomena 
such as domestication, cultivation, herding and sedentism; there is also the im-
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to take full account of technologies of intensification. Population pressure con-
tributed by leading hunter-gatherers to spread in ways made possible by tech-
nical modification, but the same kind of pressure sometimes resulted in inten-
sive adjustment involving technical and organizational change. 
A further evident tendency was for there to emerge more institutionalized so-
cial formations (states) and complex concentrated settlements (cities). The hu-
man tendency towards aggression played an important part. In association with 
these changes there is a tendency for kinship to decline in relative importance as 
a structuring principle although it always retains importance. That the same 
trends—towards food production, social complexity and urbanism—are found 
as independent developments in different parts of the globe points to the impor-
tance of gradual yet systematic change in social and technical organization i.e. in 
the patterns of cooperation (Scarre, 2005: p. 41). 
Warfare between cities and states played its part in the formation of ever larg-
er political entities. Recorded history is marked by the emergence of empires 
(Darwin, 2007) and subsequently nation states. A key feature of empire is the 
way in which the metropole confers a range of public goods throughout its ter-
ritories (Waites, 1993; Abernethy, 2000; O’Brien, 2002: p. 4; Ferguson, 2003, 
2004) thereby tending to generate a wider pattern of cooperation associated with 
a rising population. There is even a biological/ecological aspect to imperialism 
illustrated by the introductions by European colonisers of domesticated animals 
and plants (Crosby, 2004). Empire and population growth both played a part in 
the emergence of the nation-state system, initially in Europe. To a significant 
extent, a nation may be thought of as, “an imagined political community” (An-
derson, 1991: pp. 6-7); implying that part of its reality concerns the use by its 
members of theory of mind e.g. in understanding the position and differing 
contributions of their geographically remote fellow citizens. Despite the occur-
rence of wars, a fundamentally cooperative framework of nations was thereby 
created—eventually on a worldwide basis (McGrew, 2004: p. 133). More recently 
there has followed a build-up of international and supra-national governance i.e. 
structures of higher-level cooperation which perform a moderating role. There is 
evidently a dynamic setting, conducive to a steadily rising population.  
A further strategic element, the institution of money, in its physical form con-
stitutes a focus of shared reference, at once symbolizing and constituting value. 
It promotes cooperative—market-style—trading relations of goods and services 
on a geographically-extended and virtually open-ended basis. To be more pre-
cise, its very existence structures interests in such a way that there is a tendency 
for the underlying potential to cooperate in trade relations to be realized togeth-
er with a sharpening of the division of labour; its apotheosis is reflected in free 
trade. The institution has in-built dynamism tending to give rise to further re-
lated developments such as systems of borrowing and lending (perhaps at inter-
est) and insurance; that dynamism is further manifested in the emergence of ca-
pitalism and ultimately finds expression in globalization. 
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orientation is more widely and more systematically expressed in association with 
the emergence of particular institutional forms—such as money. Of central im-
portance is means-ends rationality where an objective judgment as to effective-
ness and efficiency of means may be made in relation to the achievement of an 
empirically identifiable end; bureaucracy—mankind’s greatest social invention 
according to Max Weber—is perhaps its deepest organizational expression. Com-
plex societies generate conditions conducive to the wider and more general ap-
plication of a rational approach; particularly germane to population is the ratio-
nality implied by the notion of family planning employed in recent centuries.  
14. Memes 
Following upon the development of thinking regarding the selfish gene, the no-
tion of the “meme” was introduced, viewed as a second kind of replicator. The 
meme is a cultural item with a putative tendency to replicate i.e. to be passed on 
by non-genetic means, especially imitation. In one exposition Blackmore (2000: 
p. 43) affirms that “Imitation includes any kind of copying of ideas and beha-
viour from one person to another” (See also Dawkins, 2003). Further to the 
present study and its concern with cooperative genes it may be helpful to inquire 
into possible implications for the study of memes. 
The pattern of explanation developed here is that the cooperative genes give 
rise to cooperation which tends to propagate the genes themselves. The coopera-
tive activity is not viewed as static but has an open-ended potentiality for growth 
and development. An example may help to illustrate the link between changing 
patterns of cooperation and meme propagation. There has been a relative ad-
vance in the global use of the English language since the Second World War (for 
example, relative to French) and it is instructive to point to one “growth area”. 
Air travel both of passengers and freight has built up substantially during the pe-
riod leading to the emergence of a dense and complex web of routes. Given a 
need for there to be communication between pilots and ground crew, the poten-
tial problem is the sheer multiplicity of languages which might conceivably be 
involved. The problem has been surmounted by the agreement to use English in 
many of these contexts, which forms part of the pattern whereby English has 
come to dominate in non-native speakers’ choice of a second language. Hence in 
this example replication of memes is an aspect of the growth of instances of co-
operation between pilots and ground crews. Hence it is suggestive of the conclu-
sion that the fate of memes is fundamentally bound up with associated coopera-
tive activity. 
It is informative to ask whether the same type of link is evident in other insti-
tutional spheres. There are a whole number of situations shaped by technological 
advance which have implications for vocabulary and patterns of communication. 
Looked at from one point of view half the words in the English language are now 
scientific and technical terms, but this primarily points up that the growth of 
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ployed. 
Consider from this point of view the terminology of natural history or biolo-
gy. Major figures such as Linnaeus and Darwin in effect inaugurated or devel-
oped further taxonomic programmes. The latter proposed that all species have 
descended from common ancestors and that the branching pattern of evolution 
resulted from a process he called natural selection. It followed that from that 
point in time—if not earlier—there would be a general interest in discovering 
new species and adopting and using names for them (possibly latinised) which 
would reflect their newly understood relationships. The development and use of 
the set of memes is hence essentially subordinate to a cooperatively undertaken 
scientific programme, to which individual investigators would understand them-
selves to be contributing. 
Focusing particularly on language, one must remind oneself that there are 
primary and secondary usages. A main way in which languages grow is through 
metaphor and simile. In the middle ages a substantial vocabulary surrounded the 
practice of torture. Happily that practice declined along with some of its voca-
bulary, but this does not mean every reference to it has disappeared from lin-
guistic usage. Thus we could say—just as Francis Bacon did—that scientific me-
thod involves “putting nature on the rack”, or that a particular theory or policy 
suffered “the death of a thousand cuts”, without necessarily feeling the horror at 
corresponding human suffering. However, it is quite evident that metaphor and 
simile are simply the fabric of communication in a whole number of cooperative 
contexts, far removed from those of their linguistic origins. 
From these examples it is important not to draw the conclusion that changes 
in cooperative relationships somehow produce changes in cultural items such as 
vocabulary or patterns in language usage; rather these latter changes are an as-
pect of the former ones. But this leads to an interesting tentative conclusion. It is 
not that one is presented with two “replicators”, the gene and the meme, which 
have their own distinctive lives but rather that the fate of the latter is interde-
pendent with the activity to which the former gives rise, the gene being the single 
controlling replicator. The picture is of cooperative genes giving rise to coopera-
tive behaviour which tends to propagate the genes, while the differing types of 
meme inhere in differing classes of cooperative relationship. 
15. Conclusion 
In a study drawing both from evolutionary biology and the social sciences, evi-
dence and argument are supportive of the comprehensive application of selfish 
gene theory to the human population. At the centre of attention are the genes 
giving rise to characteristically-human cooperation using language and theory of 
mind; those genes may be judged to give rise to patterns of behaviour, even in-
cluding celibacy and slavery, which initially may be felt to present insuperable 
problems. The key idea is that the behaviour which tends to propagate the coop-
erative genes may be “at cost” to the genes of some who may be party to the co-
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A primary insight is that cooperation using language and theory of mind is it-
self interdependent with full human conceptualization of a world of objects and 
their own place in it as embodied beings; so also is it significant that a stabilising 
normative element tends to arise within cooperation, which is the crucible for 
the development of morality. Importantly, too, humans can have reasons for ac-
tion which are “desire-independent” and they can “delay gratification”, which 
gives rise to a behavioural “range of options”; hence the way is open to an ex-
tended and flexible elaboration in the human division of labour, a centrally im-
portant condition for long-term population growth. Human capacities inhering 
in, or arising out of, the ability to cooperate are also responsible for a vitally im-
portant long-term process—the domestication of animals and plants. 
This study increases understanding of the link between zoology and social 
anthropology: there is enhanced insight into the difference between animal and 
human sexual behaviour and explanation of the emergence of kinship systems 
involving the social recognition of blood ties. A framework of kinship and affinal 
links renews society and facilitates population growth. The pattern of that 
growth may be further understood using Trivers’ Parent-Offspring Conflict 
Theory and Lack’s Principle. A greater level of complexity in societies tends to 
arise from competition between societies at a simpler level of complexity. It is 
not the case that various independent variables cause growth in the dependent 
variable of population size; rather, a set of analytically distinguishable elements— 
including societal complexity, the rate of technological innovation, food produc-
tion, and population size and density—inter-affect one another within the con-
text of systematic change. 
In respect of the conditions for population growth, a suggestive orienting idea 
is that of the social contract: what are needed are mechanisms which allow hu-
mans to tolerate each other and reduce the costs of living in close proximity: the 
primary one is development or reshaping of the division and specialisation of 
labour (both within groups and in space), which tends to increase productivity 
while diminishing the tendency for conflict to occur. That structural elaboration 
is interdependent with the high degree of flexibility which humans exhibit. The 
fact is that humans can be observed to survive—and propagate—in very unequal 
situations and even when subordinated in coercive-cooperative relationships 
such as slavery. Significantly too religious groups are the largest which humans 
have created; they promote normative integration and social solidarity. Reli-
gion’s overall contribution to population is generally such as to promote its 
growth. 
In the understanding of prehistory and history, it is of the greatest significance 
that the same trends—including food production, social complexity and urban-
ism—arose as independent developments at different times and places on the 
globe; the explanation lies in the precise character of human cooperative beha-
viour. Similarly significant is the emergence of differing kinds of political enti-
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tions tend to be created which are favourable to population growth. Important 
features of complex societies which sustain and extend human cooperation are 
the built environment, writing and money.  
While rationality has always inhered in human behaviour, the more extended 
adoption of a rational approach to aspects of life (e.g. in respect of one’s own 
fertility) is interdependent with the development of institutional forms. There is 
a long-term trend—manifested in globalization—for humans to reconfigure the 
external world so as to maximise the possibilities for their own cooperation in it. 
Contrary to one’s initial expectation, the threat or experience of violence and 
war played an essential part in the creation of the conditions for long-term pop-
ulation growth. In addition, however, it is also of the greatest significance that 
societal and institutional change over time—focusing on such shared ideas as 
property and national sovereignty—has realized a latent potential for wider co-
operation without recourse to war. 
The global picture of recent decades is of steady and sustainable population 
growth; the 2020-2021 pandemic could alter that, but already it is intensifying 
new types of global cooperation geared to combating increases in morbidity and 
mortality, for example in the development and distribution of vaccines. Howev-
er, sustainable overall growth in population is accompanied by a rising propor-
tion who are “paying a substantial cost” in terms of loss of their own potential 
fertility; plainly those in the European nation states fall into the latter category. 
The significance of the reduced family size in western societies is sometimes 
presented as a kind of “release from the genetic treadmill” but this is not so. 
Those who reproduce most will contribute most to the species’ future gene pool. 
The issue again concerns Lack’s principle (see above). The changed conditions 
for fertility decision-making are: high rates of offspring survival and the dramat-
ically increased costs of rearing, especially with the arrival of a knowledge 
economy, it being very expensive to rear children and place them effectively in 
the social and marriage markets. 
It arises from this account that the gene is the single controlling replicator; the 
notion of the meme as a second independent replicator cannot do the work as-
signed to it. The theory of the selfish gene in an exclusively individualistic form 
fails to grasp the complexity of human life. It is the move to focus on cooperative 
genes which provides the needed additional element, the key to grasping com-
plexity. The future expression of the selfishness of the human cooperative genes 
is essentially open-ended. What is clear is that it could have implications for, and 
frequently be “at cost” to, the propagation of any of the other genes of other life 
forms both on this planet and, conceivably also, elsewhere. 
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